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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter based upon Section 78A-4103(2) (h) of the Utah Code, as it concerns dismissal of a petition for paternity.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the district court properly conclude as a matter of law that petitioner,

the unmarried biological father of a child placed with adoptive parents, failed to
demonstrate a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood because
he did not strictly comply with the terms of Section 78-30-4.14lof the Utah Adoption
Act.
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment presents only questions of law,
[the court] gives no deference to the district court's legal decisions and [it reviews] them
for correctness." Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50, H 6 {quoting Fericks v. Lucy
Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, U 10, 100 P.3d 1200).
This issue was raised in respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. [Record ("R.") at 58-68]
2.

Did the district court properly conclude as a matter of law that petitioner,

the unmarried biological father of a child placed with adoptive parents, waived and
surrendered any right which he may have had in relation to the child because he did not
strictly comply with the terms of Section 78-30-4.14 of the Utah Code.
1

In 2008, the Utah Legislature recodified Title 78 of the Utah Code, the Judicial Code. The Utah
Adoption Act is now found in Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 1. Although the recodification did not
alter the meaning of the Utah Adoption Act, this brief will refer to Code sections according to the
Code in effect at the relevant time and as referenced in submissions to the district court.
v

Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment presents only questions of law,
[the court] gives no deference to the district court's legal decisions and [it reviews] them
for correctness." Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50, U 6 {quoting Fericks v. Lucy
Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, H 10, 100 P.3d 1200).
This issue was raised by the court during oral argument and addressed in
respondent's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment. [R. at 58-68]

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in adoption proceedings.
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of all parties affected by an
adoption proceeding must be considered and balanced in determining what constitutional
protections and processes are necessary and appropriate.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for
adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive
placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children;
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions
about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make
timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and the future of the child, and is
entitled to assurance regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement;
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive
placements;
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest
in retaining custody of an adopted child; and
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth.
The state has a compelling interest in requiring unmarried biological fathers to
demonstrate that commitment by providing appropriate medical care and financial
support and by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.
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(3) (a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.12 through 78-30-4.21, the Legislature prescribes
the conditions for determining whether an unmarried biological father's action is
sufficiently prompt and substantial to require constitutional protection.
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities to establish a
relationship with his child that are available to him, his biological parental interest
may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure
to timely exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps
to substantiate it.
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the state's
compelling interest. The Legislature finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the
child, and the adoptive parents described in this section outweigh the interest of an
unmarried biological father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and
demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.
(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility to protect his rights.
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to know that the child may be adopted
without his consent unless he strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter, manifests a
prompt and full commitment to his parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity.
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of privacy with regard to
her pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the identity of
an unmarried biological father prior to or during an adoption proceeding, and has no obligation
to volunteer information to the court with respect to the father.
78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for adoption.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), consent to adoption of a child, or
relinquishment of a child for adoption, is required from:
(a) the adoptee, if the adoptee is more than 12 years of age, unless the adoptee does not
have the mental capacity to consent;
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee who was conceived or
born within a marriage;
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage;
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to be the child's biological father
by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the mother's execution of consent to
adoption or her relinquishment of the child for adoption;
(e) consistent with Subsection (3), any biological parent who has executed and filed
a voluntary declaration of paternity with the state registrar of vital statistics within
the Department of Health in accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary
Declaration of Paternity Act, prior to the mother's execution of consent to adoption or
her relinquishment of the child for adoption;
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, only if he strictly complies with
the requirements of Subsections (4) through (8) and (10); and
(g) the person or agency to whom an adoptee has been relinquished and that is
placing the child for adoption.
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(2) (a) The consent of a person described in Subsections (l)(b) through (g) is not
required if the adoptee is 18 years of age or older.
(b) The consent of a person described in Subsections (l)(b) through (f) is not
required if the person's parental rights relating to the adoptee have been terminated.
(3) For purposes of Subsection (l)(e), a voluntary declaration of paternity is considered
filed when it is entered into a database that:
(a) can be accessed by the Department of Health; and
(b) is designated by the state registrar of vital statistics as the official database for
voluntary declarations of paternity.
(4) Except as provided in Subsections (5)(a) and (10), and subject to Subsection
(8), with regard to a child who is placed with adoptive parents more than six months after
birth, consent of an unmarried biological father is not required unless the unmarried
biological father:
(a) (i) developed a substantial relationship with the child by:
(A) visiting the child monthly, unless the unmarried biological father was
physically or financially unable to visit the child on a monthly basis; or
(B) engaging in regular communication with the child or with the person or
authorized agency that has lawful custody of the child;
(ii) took some measure of responsibility for the child and the child's future; and
(iii) demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
financial support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum in accordance with the
father's ability; or
(b) (i) openly lived with the child:
(A) (I) for a period of at least six months during the one-year period
immediately preceding the day on which the child is placed with adoptive
parents; or
(II) if the child is less than one year old, for a period of at least six
months during the period of time beginning on the day on which the child is
born and ending on the day on which the child is placed with adoptive
parents; and
(B) immediately preceding placement of the child with adoptive parents;
and
(ii) openly held himself out to be the father of the child during the six-month
period described in Subsection (4)(b)(i)(A).
(5) (a) If an unmarried biological father was prevented from complying with a
requirement of Subsection (4) by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody
of the child, the unmarried biological father is not required to comply with that
requirement.
(b) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father, whether expressed or
otherwise, that is unsupported by evidence that the requirements in Subsection (4)
have been met, shall not preclude a determination that the father failed to meet the
requirements of Subsection (4).

vin

(6) Except as provided in Subsection (10), and subject to Subsection (8), with regard to a
child who is six months of age or less at the time the child is placed with adoptive parents,
consent of an unmarried biological father is not required unless, prior to the time the
mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child for adoption, the
unmarried biological father:
(a) initiates proceedings in a district court of the state of Utah to establish paternity
under Title 78, Chapter 45g, Utah Uniform Parentage Act;
(b) files with the court that is presiding over the paternity proceeding a sworn
affidavit:
(i) stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child;
(ii) setting forth his plans for care of the child; and
(iii) agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses
incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth;
(c) consistent with Subsection (7), files notice of the commencement of paternity
proceedings, described in Subsection (6)(a), with the state registrar of vital
statistics within the Department of Health, in a confidential registry established by the
department for that purpose; and
(d) offered to pay and paid a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in
connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance with his
financial ability, unless:
(i) he did not have actual knowledge of the pregnancy;
(ii) he was prevented from paying the expenses by the person or authorized agency
having lawful custody of the child; or
(iii) the mother refuses to accept the unmarried biological father's offer to pay the
expenses described in this Subsection (6)(d).
(7) The notice described in Subsection (6)(c) is considered filed when it is entered into the
registry described in Subsection (6)(c).
(8) Consent of an unmarried biological father is not required under this section if:
(a) the court determines, in accordance with the requirements and procedures of Title
78, Chapter 3a, Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, that the unmarried biological
father's rights should be terminated, based on the petition of any interested party; or
(b) (i) a declaration of paternity declaring the unmarried biological father to be the
father of the child is rescinded under Section 78-45g-306; and
(ii) the unmarried biological father fails to comply with Subsection (6) within ten
business days after the day that notice of the rescission described in Subsection
(8)(b)(i) is mailed by the Office of Vital Records within the Department of
Health as provided in Section 78-45g-306.
(9) Unless the adoptee is conceived or bom within a marriage, the petitioner in an adoption
proceeding shall, prior to entrance of afinaldecree of adoption, file with the court a certificate
from the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, stating:
(a) that a diligent search has been made of the registry of noticesfromunmarried
biological fathers described in Subsection (6)(c); and
(b) (i) that no filing has been found pertaining to the father of the child in question; or
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(ii) if a filing is found, the name of the putative father and the time and date of filing.
(10) (a) For purposes of this Subsection (10), "qualifying circumstance" means that, at
any point during the time period beginning at the conception of the child and ending at the
time the mother executed a consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for adoption:
(i) the child or the child's mother resided, on a permanent or temporary basis, in
the state of Utah;
(ii) the mother intended to give birth to the child in the state of Utah;
(iii) the child was born in the state of Utah; or
(iv) the mother intended to execute a consent to adoption or relinquishment of
the child for adoption:
(A)
in the state of Utah; or
(B)
under the laws of the state of Utah.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (10)(c)(i), a court shall consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether an unmarried biological father has demonstrated
a full commitment to his parental responsibilities, including, if applicable:
(i) efforts he has taken to discover the location of the child or the child's mother;
(ii) whether he has expressed or demonstrated an interest in taking responsibility
for the child;
(iii) whether, and to what extent, he has developed, or attempted to develop, a
relationship with the child;
(iv) whether he offered to provide and, if the offer was accepted, did provide,
financial support for the child or the child's mother;
(v) whether, and to what extent, he has communicated, or attempted to
communicate, with the child or the child's mother;
(vi) whether he has filed legal proceedings to establish his paternity of, and take
responsibility for, the child;
(vii) whether he has filed a notice with a public official or agency relating to:
(A)
his paternity of the child; or
(B)
legal proceedings to establish his paternity of the child; or
(viii) other evidence that demonstrates that he has demonstrated a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (4) and (6), the consent of an
unmarried biological father is required with respect to an adoptee who is under the age
of 18 if:
(i) (A) the unmarried biological father did not know, and through the exercise of
reasonable diligence could not have known, before the time the mother executed a
consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for adoption, that a qualifying
circumstance existed;
(B) before the mother executed a consent to adoption or relinquishment of the
child for adoption, the unmarried biological father fully complied with the
requirements to establish parental rights in the child, and to preserve the
right to notice of a proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child,
imposed by:

x

(I) the last state where the unmarried biological father knew, or through
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the mother
resided in before the mother executed the consent to adoption or
relinquishment of the child for adoption; or
(II) the state where the child was conceived; and
(C) the unmarried biological father has demonstrated, based on the totality
of the circumstances, a full commitment to his parental responsibilities, as
described in Subsection (10)(b); or
(ii) (A) the unmarried biological father knew, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known, before the time the mother executed a
consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for adoption, that a qualifying
circumstance existed; and
(B) the unmarried biological father complied with the requirements of
Subsection (4) or (6) before the later of:
(I) 20 days after the day that the unmarried biological father knew, or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that a
qualifying circumstance existed; or
(II) the time that the mother executed a consent to adoption or
relinquishment of the child for adoption.
(11) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply with the
requirements of this section is considered to have waived and surrendered any right in
relation to the child, including the right to:
(a) notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child;
and
(b) consent, or refuse to consent, to the adoption of the child.
78-30-4.15. Responsibility of each party for own actions — Fraud or
misrepresentation.
(1) Each parent of a child conceived or born outside of marriage is responsible for his
or her own actions and is not excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this
chapter based upon any action, statement, or omission of the other parent or third parties.
(2) Any person injured by fraudulent representations or actions in connection with an
adoption is entitled to pursue civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law.
A fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance with the requirements of this
chapter, and is not a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption
decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party. Custody determinations shall
be based on the best interest of the child, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-304.16.
(3) The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk of fraud or
Misrepresentation in adoption proceedings, and has provided a method for absolute
protection of an unmarried biological father's rights by compliance with the provisions of
this chapter. In balancing the rights and interests of the state, and of all parties affected by
fraud, specifically the child, the adoptive parents, and the unmarried biological father, the
xi

Legislature has determined that the unmarried biological father is in the best position to
prevent or ameliorate the effects of fraud and that, therefore, the burden of fraud shall be
borne by him.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner commenced this action by filing a Verified Petition for Paternity and
Contesting Adoption ("Petition") on August 31, 2007. [R. at 3-31] With the Petition, he
sought to establish his parental rights and gain custody of a child born to respondent
Emily Baird five months earlier, on March 29, 2007, and relinquished by Ms. Baird to
respondent LDS Family Services for adoption on April 22, 2007. [R. at 70-73]
Respondents moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the Petition based upon
petitioner's failure to file in a timely fashion. [R. at 58-68, 88-89] The court granted
respondent's Motion on March 17, 2008, and it entered its Order of Dismissal on April
16, 2008. [R. at 255-62] This appeal followed.
Statement of Facts
Respondent Emily Baird is the mother of a baby girl born March 29, 2007 in Logan,
Utah. [R. at 70-73] Petitioner Nicholas Rowe, an Idaho resident, is the biological father
of the child. [R. at 5]
Conception was the result of a single act of sexual activity between Mr. Rowe and
Ms. Baird which took place in July 2006 in Pocatello, Idaho. [R. at 5] Although Ms.
Baird and Mr. Rowe had been dating prior to that time, Ms. Baird has asserted that she
did not consent to the sexual activity; Mr. Rowe denies this. Because, however, of the
circumstances surrounding the conception, the communication between Mr. Rowe and
xii

Ms. Baird was limited during her pregnancy. Communication was primarily through text
messaging and intermediaries, including relatives and Church leaders. [R. at 5-10]
Despite the limits on communication, it is undisputed that Mr. Rowe was aware of
Ms. Baird's pregnancy by November 2006. [R. at 5, 59, 78-80] He was also aware that
Ms. Baird was considering placing her child for adoption. [R. at 5, 59, 78-80]
Mr. Rowe has asserted that he was not notified when the child was born. [R. at 8-9]
He admits, however, to learning of the birth by April 14, 2007. [R. at 59, 81-82] He
further admits that on that date he was made aware that the child had been born in Utah,
as he called the hospital in Logan on that date to inquire about the birth. [R. at 59, 83]
Eight days after Mr. Rowe learned of the birth, on April 22, 2007, Ms. Baird
relinquished the child to LDS Family Services for adoption. [R. at 59, 70-73]

In

connection with the relinquishment, LDS Family Services checked the putative father
registries for both Utah and Idaho; these revealed no filings by Mr. Rowe. LDS Family
Services placed the child with adoptive parents, with whom she has resided since that
time.
In May 2007, at the request of Mr. Rowe and with the the consent of LDS Family
Services, DNA testing was performed to determine whether Mr. Rowe was the child's
biological father. [R. at 60, 84, 87] The testing, which was paid for by LDS Family
Services, concluded that Mr. Rowe was the father of the child. [R. at 60]
Although Mr. Rowe received the results of the testing in May, he waited until
August 31, 2007, to file the present action. [R. at 3] He has not filed an action in Idaho
to establish paternity of the child. [R. at 60, 87].
xiii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pursuant to the Utah Adoption Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1 et seq., the
unmarried biological father of a child placed for adoption has only an "inchoate interest."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e). If he desires to exercise parental rights, he must
strictly comply with the terms of the Adoption Act in order demonstrate his commitment
to parenthood. Id. While the application of the Adoption Act can be harsh, both the Utah
State Legislature and courts addressing it have adopted and upheld its provisions. They
have done so based upon the interests of the State, the mother and the child in prompt and
secure adoptive placements. A "firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential" for stable
adoptive placements. Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984).
Only with such a cutoff can birth mothers and adoptive parents can make necessary
decisions in a timely fashion.
For a child less than six months old at the time of placement, the Adoption Act
requires that an unmarried biological father do the following: (1) he must file a paternity
action; (2) he must sign and file an affidavit stating his plans for the child; (3) he must
file notice of his paternity action with the state registrar of vital statistics within the Utah
Department of Health; and (4) he must provide financial support in connection with the
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14 (6). Generally,
each of these requirements must be satisfied prior to the time the mother relinquishes the
child for adoption. Id. In some cases, a father is allowed additional time, up to twenty
days from the date the father learned of the child's birth in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 7830-4.14(10)(c). A father who fails to satisfy these requirements, "is considered to have
xiv

waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child." Utah Code Ann. § 78-304.14(11).
Petitioner did not strictly comply with the Adoption Act. He waited until more than
four months after Ms. Baird's relinquishment to file a paternity action. Based upon his
failure, the child was placed with adoptive parents, where she has since resided. Based
upon petitioner's failure, the Petition was appropriately dismissed.
In this appeal, Mr. Rowe does not challenge the constitutionality of the Adoption
Act. Instead, he argues that there are disputed issues of fact that require an evidentiary
hearing. He suggests that there is evidence showing that it was impossible for him to
comply with the Adoption Act. The material facts, however, are not in dispute. Mr.
Rowe, with full awareness of Ms. Baird's pregnancy and of the child's birth in Utah, did
not seek to demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood until the
child was five months old. Only then did he file his Petition, despite ample opportunity
to do so in a timely fashion. Thus, his arguments fail, as he was required to strictly
comply with the Adoption Act. See, e.g., In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1121
(Utah 1995).
As none of the arguments set forth by petitioner justify his failure to strictly comply
with the Adoption Act, the court should affirm the dismissal of his Petition by the district
court.

xv

ARGUMENT
Petitioner's claim is governed by the Utah Adoption Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1
et seq. It provides that an unmarried biological father must strictly comply with its terms
if he desires either notice of or a right to consent to the adoption of his biological child.
In this case, petitioner failed to strictly comply with the Adoption Act, thereby waiving
and surrendering any rights he might have had in relation to the child. Utah Code Ann. §
78-30-4.14(11). Based on this failure, the district court properly dismissed his Petition as
a matter of law.
I.

A.

PETITIONER DID NOT DID NOT STRICTLYCOMPLY WITH
THE ADOPTION ACT; THEREFORE, THE DISTRICT COURT
PROPERLY DISMISSED HIS PETITION.

Statutory Standards
The rights and responsibilities of persons involved in the adoption of a child are

set forth by Section 78-30-4.12(2) of the Adoption Act. Its provisions apply specifically
to children born outside of a marriage. It states: "[T]he state has a compelling interest in
providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, [and] in
preventing the disruption of adoptive placements . . . ." Subsection (a). The "unmarried
mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a
newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make timely and appropriate
decisions regarding her future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance
regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement." Subsection (b). The child has "a
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As noted above, this brief will refer to pertinent Code sections using numbering in place at the
time of the events in question and as cited in respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements." Subsection (c). The
"adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in
retaining custody of an adopted child." Subsection (d).
By contrast, an unmarried father, has only "an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth."
Subsection (e) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the "state has a compelling interest in
requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate that commitment... by
establishing legal paternity in accordance with the requirements of this chapter." Id.
Statutory standards are applied to determine whether the unwed father's conduct
"is sufficiently prompt and substantial to require constitutional protection" of his interest.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(a). If the father fails timely to grasp his opportunity for
legal rights through strict compliance with statutory procedures, "his biological parental
interest may be lost entirely." Subsection (b). "A certain degree of finality is necessary
in order to facilitate the state's compelling interest" in providing prompt and permanent
placements for adoptive children. Therefore, "the interests of the state, the mother, the
child, and the adoptive parents . . . outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological
father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish" his parental rights in
accordance with statutory requirements. Subsection (c) (emphasis added). The
unmarried father "has the primary responsibility to protect his rights," and he "is
presumed to know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly
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complies with" statutory requirements to establish his rights. Subsections (d) and (e)
(emphasis added).
In a case such as the present, involving a newborn child placed with adoptive
parents within a month after birth, an unwed father seeking to assert rights, including
those of notice and consent to the adoption, must "strictly compl[y]" with the
requirements of Section 78-30-4.14 (6) of the Adoption Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-304.14 (l)(f) and (6). These require the father to demonstrate his full commitment to
parental responsibilities by doing the following:
• "[I]nitiat[ing] proceedings in a district court of the state of Utah to establish
paternity. . .;
• [F]il[ing] with the court that is presiding over the paternity proceeding a
sworn affidavit: (i) stating that he is fully able and willing to have full
custody of the child; (ii) setting forth his plans for care of the child; and
(iii) agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses
incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth . .

• [F]il[ing] notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings . . . with
the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health . . .;
and
• [OJffering to pay and pa[ying] a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses
incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in
accordance with his financial ability.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(6). Generally he must satisfy these requirements, "prior to
the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child for
adoption." Id. However, for out-of-state fathers who learn of the child's birth in Utah
shortly before the mother's relinquishment, compliance may be demonstrated, "before the
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later of: (I) 20 days after the day that the unmarried biological father knew, or through the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known [of the Utah birth]; or (II) the time
that the mother executed a consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for
adoption." Utah Code Ann § 78-30-4.14(10).
The penalty for lack of strict compliance is forfeiture of the father's rights.
Section 78-30-4.14 (11) states:
An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply with
each of the conditions provided in this section, is considered to have waived
and surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to:
(a) notice of any judicial proceedings in connection with the
adoption of the child, and
(b) consent, or refuse to consent, to the adoption of the child,
[emphasis added]
Accordingly, an unwed father who fails to comply strictly with these statutory
requirements has no rights in relation to the child.
B.

Case Precedent
Although recognizing that its results are at times harsh, Utah appellate courts have

consistently upheld the strict enforcement and constitutionality of the Adoption Code.
For example, in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984), an unwed
father visited the mother and child in the hospital and "assumed the three of them would
eventually live together." Id. at 755. Later that day, the mother relinquished the child for
adoption, and the father attempted to register his paternity, but he registered one day late.
He challenged the adoption on the basis that he did not know of the statutory registration
requirement. The Utah Supreme Court rejected his claim, concluding that, "there is no
constitutional requirement that [an unwed father receive] actual notice of the statutory
4

requirements for establishing paternal rights." Id. Moreover, "[i]t is of no constitutional
importance that Sanchez came close to complying with the statute. Because of the nature
of subject matter dealt with by the statute, a firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not
essential." Id. The Court also rejected the notion that a hearing should be held in every
case to determine "the degree of the father's diligence and sincerity in trying to establish
his parental rights," noting that such factors "are foreign to the statutory provisions," and
such a process would disrupt the adoption system with "protracted litigation," causing
"incalculable" and possibly "incurable" harm to the infants involved. Id. The Court
concluded that unwed fathers may fairly be required to comply with statutory
requirements:
It is not too harsh to require that those responsible for bringing children into
the world outside the established institution of marriage should be required
either to comply with those statutes that accord them the opportunity to
assert their parental rights or to yield to the method established by society
to raise children in a manner best suited to promote their welfare.
Id. at 756; see also Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 201-02 (Utah 1984)
(acknowledgment of paternity mailed prior to mother's relinquishment but not received
by Department of Health until after relinquishment was too late to establish father's
rights); Swayne v. L.D.S Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah 1990) ("When an
illegitimate child is relinquished by its mother, the rights of the father are automatically
terminated unless he has previously filed an acknowledgment of paternity.").
An unwed father's known opposition to adoption neither establishes his rights nor
prevents the mother from relinquishing the child. In the case of In re Adoption ofB.B.D.,
984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999), a nonresident unwed father expressed opposition to the
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proposed adoption, but he took no legal action until after the mother's relinquishment,
when he intervened in the adoption proceeding. Reaffirming the constitutionality of the
adoption statutes, as discussed above, the Supreme Court held that the father "lost any
parental right or interest to" his child by failing to establish paternity in compliance with
the statutes. Id. at 970. By engaging in a sexual relationship with the mother, the unwed
father "is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption" may occur;
moreover, "it becomes his responsibility to protect his own rights." Id. at 971. "[A]n
informal acknowledgment of paternity" or expressed opposition to adoption is
insufficient to protect his rights. Id. at 972. See also Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services,
supra, at 641 ("a father who informally acknowledges his responsibility . . . may later
deny paternity and possibly avoid legal liability for his child's care").
Neither is the untimely filing of a paternity action alone sufficient to establish the
unwed father's rights. In Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d at 892 (Utah App. 1996), the unwed
father, a California resident, expressed opposition to the proposed adoption and
commenced a paternity action in California prior to the mother's relinquishment in Utah.
However, the court held that these actions did not relieve the father of strict compliance
with Utah law: "[T]he statutes demand strict compliance with the notice of paternity
requirement and not even substantial compliance will suffice." Id. at 896 (emphasis
added). "Utah law requires strict compliance to provide certainty and finality to
adoptions so that the parties involved, especially the child, are not compromised." Id. at
898. Because the father failed strictly to comply with the law, he was barred from
contesting the adoption. See also In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah App.
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1995) (unwed father "forfeited" his parental rights by failure timely to register his claim
of paternity).
C.

Application of Law to Petitioner
Based on the pertinent statutes and governing precedent, Mr. Rowe has no parental

rights. The undisputed facts demonstrate that he was fully aware of Ms. Baird's
pregnancy and her consideration of adoption. [R. at 5, 59, 78-80] Although he contends
that he was not made immediately aware of the child's birth, he admits to learning of it
by April 14, 2007. [R. at 59, 81-82]. He also learned on that date that the child had been
born in Logan, Utah. [R. at 59, 83]
Ms. Baird signed her Relinquishment in favor of LDS Family Services on April
22. [R. at 59, 70-73] The child was then placed with adoptive parents. Mr. Rowe does
not assert that he strictly complied with the Adoption Act. He did not file a paternity
action prior to Ms. Baird's relinquishment or within twenty days of learning that the child
had been born in Utah. [R. at 3, 59-60] Likewise, he did not file a paternity action when
DNA testing showed that he was the child's biological father. [R. at 3, 59-60] Instead,
he waited until August to file a paternity action. [R. at 3] Because he did not file in a
timely fashion, he "waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-4.14 (11); see also In re Adoption ofWy supra, 904 P.2d at 1123.
Non-compliance with the Adoption Act disqualifies an unmarried biological father
from asserting parental rights. The Adoption Act repeatedly stresses the need for strict
compliance, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.12 (3), 78-30-4.14 (1) (f), and courts have
confirmed that "requiring strict compliance with the adoption statutes is reasonable
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because of the nature of adoptions." In re Adoption ofW, supra, 904 P.2d at 1121 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995)(citing Sanchez, supra, 680 P.2d at 755).
Because Mr. Rowe did not strictly comply with the Adoption Act, the district
court properly dismissed his Petition. This court should affirm that dismissal.
II.

PETITIONER HAS NOT PRESENTED A DISPUTE OF MATERIAL
FACT SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Unable to present evidence that he strictly complied with the Adoption Act, Mr.
Rowe makes several arguments, none of which are persuasive or supported by pertinent
law. Significantly, he does not present an argument challenging the constitutionality of
the Adoption Act. Rather, he argues based on the terms of the Act.
A,

Mr. Rowe had Actual Knowledge that the Child was Born in Utah.
Mr. Rowe first argues that he has presented facts sufficient to overcome summary

judgment. Although he does not specifically identify a factual dispute, he asserts that he,
"was not given an opportunity to present evidence that he could not reasonably have
expected to have been born in Logan Utah [sic]." [Brief of Appellant, p. 34]
There was, however, no reason for the court to consider such evidence. By Mr.
Rowe's admission, he was aware of the child's birth in Logan before Ms. Baird's
relinquishment. [R. at 59, 81-83] Thus, he had actual knowledge of the birth. Based on
his knowledge, there is no need to consider whether he might have expected the child to
be born in Logan.
B.

Mr. Rowe had Ample Time to Comply with the Requirements of the Utah
Adoption Act.
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Mr. Rowe also complains that it took him sixteen days to learn of the birth and
that he "had just five business days" to comply with the Adoption Act. [Brief of
Appellant, p. 35] This is inaccurate. Even if the court accepts Mr. Rowe's version of
events, as it must in addressing the grant of summary judgment, the Adoption Act
anticipates the possibility that an out-of-state biological father would learn of the child's
birth in Utah shortly before a birth mother's relinquishment. Such circumstances are
governed by Section 78-30-4.14(10). It provides that the "unmarried biological father"
may comply with the requirements of Subsection . . . (6) before the later of: (I) 20 days
after the day that the unmarried biological father knew, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known, that a qualifying circumstance existed; or (II)
the time that the mother executed a consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for
adoption." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(10)(c)(ii).
Mr. Rowe became aware of a "qualifying circumstance" when he learned on April
14 that the child "was born in the State of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 78-304.14(10)(a)(iii). Therefore, based upon facts that he has admitted, he had twenty days
from April 14 to comply with the statutory requirements. As has been noted, he failed to
so do.
On this point, it should be noted that Utah appellate courts have held, in a similar
context, that allowing a father ten days to comply with the Adoption Act is
constitutionally permissible. In In re Adoption ofW, supra, 904 P.2d at 1122, the Utah
Court of Appeals evaluated a prior version of the Act, which required a putative father to
register notice of paternity within ten days after it became possible for him to do so. Id.
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The court held that this period, "while short, is not impermissibly short." Id. Applying
this to the present case, the twenty days which Mr. Rowe had was not impermissibly
short. He had ample time to act.
C.

Mr. Rowe's Allegations of Deception Do Not Present a Dispute of Material
Fact.
Finally, in suggesting that there is a dispute of material fact sufficient to overcome

summary judgment, Mr. Rowe argues that Ms. Baird deceived him and that she was
aware of his desire to raise the child. Neither of these points presents a dispute of
material fact. As to the former, the Adoption Act provides that, "the unmarried
biological father is in the best position to prevent or ameliorate the effects of fraud and
that, therefore, the burden of fraud shall be borne by him." Utah Code Ann. § 78-304.15(3). He is, "responsible for his own actions," Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(1), and
"presumed to know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly
complies with the [Adoption Act], manifests a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e).
Therefore, "[a] fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance with the
requirements of this chapter, and is not a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption,
vacation of an adoption decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(2). Based on these provisions, any alleged deception is
immaterial.
As to the latter issue, this was addressed by the court the case of In re Adoption of
B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). It held that a nonresident unwed father who expressed
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opposition to the proposed adoption, but took no legal action until after the mother's
relinquishment, "lost any parental right or interest to" his child by failing to establish
paternity in compliance with the statutes. Id. at 970. Thus, "an informal
acknowledgment of paternity" or expressed opposition to adoption is insufficient to
protect a father's rights. Id. at 972. See also Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, at
641.
In light of the pertinent statutes and governing cases, there is no dispute of
material fact in this case. The district court properly granted summary judgment based
on Mr. Rowe's admitted knowledge of the child's birth in Utah and his failure to take
action to establish his rights for more than four months.
III.

PETITIONER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FULL COMMITMENT
TO HIS PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES BECAUSE HE DID NOT
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADOPTION
ACT.

Mr. Rowe next argues that the district court's decision was incorrect because he
demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities. In so doing, he refers to
various factors, including his Idaho residency, his expressed desires to parent the child,
and alleged deception by Ms. Baird.
A.

A Full Commitment to Parental Responsibilities is Demonstrated by
Compliance with the Utah Adoption Act; Mr. Rowe Failed to Comply.
The points presented by Mr. Rowe do not demonstrate or suggest a full

commitment to his parental responsibilities. The Adoption Act specifies that unwed
fathers, "demonstrate that commitment by providing appropriate medical care and
financial support and by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the requirements
11

of Tthe Adoption Actl." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e)(emphasis added). As was
demonstrated above, Mr. Rowe did not seek to establish legal paternity in a timely
fashion. Therefore, as a matter of law, he did not demonstrate a full commitment to
parental responsibilities.
Mr. Rowe also refers to several cases, most notably Ellis v. Social Services Dep 't
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). Ellis is
notable for its holding that, "when it is impossible for the father to file the required notice
of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his own, . . . due process
requires that he be permitted to show that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the statute." Id. At 1256.
Ellis does not apply here. As noted above, Mr. Rowe has admitted to learning on
April 14, 2007, that the child had been born in Utah. Under the pertinent statutes, he had
twenty days (a constitutionally suitable period) to file a paternity action (with suitable
affidavit) and to register notice of that action with the state registrar of vital statistics in
the Utah Department of Health. Based on such facts and the applicable law, it was not, as
a matter of law, impossible for him to comply with the requirements. In fact, it would
have been simple for him to comply. Therefore, no hearing of the sort described by Ellis
was required.
Mr. Rowe also refers to the dissent in Osborne v. Adoption Center for Choice,
2003 UT 15, 70 P.3d 58, which upheld the Ellis standard. Significantly, the majority of
the Supreme Court concluded in Osborne that an out-of-state father had not demonstrated
a full commitment to his parental responsibilities. Id. ^[34. It held:
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By refusing to comply with the putative father requirements of this state or
the state where the mother previously resided, Osborne has placed himself
in the position where Utah court's cannot recognize him as an interested
individual with rights to challenge an adoption proceeding.
Id.
The same is true here. It remains a requirement of the Utah Adoption Act that an
out-of-state father who does not know of a "qualifying circumstance" must comply with
"the requirements to establish parental rights in the child, and to preserve the right of
notice of a proceeding with the adoption of the child, imposed by (I) the last state where
the unmarried biological father knew . . . that the mother resided in . . .; or (II) the state
where the child was conceived." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(10)(c)(i)(B). In the
present case, even if Mr. Rowe could show that he was not aware of the child's birth in
Utah, he still would be unable to assert parental rights. Idaho law is similar to that in
Utah, requiring that a father seeking to receive notice of adoption proceedings file a
paternity action and register with the putative father registry. Idaho Code § 16-1513. Mr.
Rowe has not filed a paternity action in Idaho. [R. at 60, 87]
Mr. Rowe next refers to Swayne v. LDS Social Services, 795 P.2d 637 (Utah
1990). Like Osborne, Swayne was a decision adverse to the father. Therefore, it will not
support Mr. Rowe's position. The court determined that because the father had not
complied with the Adoption Act, he would not be allowed to assert parental rights.
B,

Mr. Rowe Admits to Being Aware of a Qualifying Circumstance.
Mr. Rowe also refers to the statutory language defining "qualifying circumstance,"

asserting that he "did not know and though his reasonable diligence could not have
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known, before the time the mother executed a consent to adoption or relinquishment of
the child for adoption, that a qualifying circumstance existed in this case." [Brief of
Appellant, p. 43] He does so as part of an argument seeking to require a hearing on his
commitment to parental responsibilities based on the totality of the circumstances.
This assertion is contrary to the record. Because Mr. Rowe knew on April 14 that
Ms. Baird had given birth in Utah, he was aware of a "qualifying circumstance." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(10)(a). Therefore, his commitment to parental responsibilities
must be judged based on his compliance with the Adoption Act. Utah Code Ann. § 7830-4.14(10)(c). As Mr. Rowe did not comply with the Act, his argument fails.
C.

Mr. Rowe's Ignorance of the Utah Adoption Act Does not Justify his Failure
to Comply.
Finally, Mr. Rowe suggests that he should be excused from the statutory

requirements because he was not aware of them. This argument, however, is precluded
based on Sanchez, supra, 680 P.2d at 755. There, the court concluded that, "there is no
constitutional requirement that [an unwed father receive] actual notice of the statutory
requirements for establishing paternal rights." Id,
Put simply, Mr. Rowe cannot demonstrate a commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood. He did not comply with the requirements to do so. His failure is clear.
Even after learning of the birth and adoptive placement, he asked for DNA testing. This
was permitted, and he was informed in May 2007 that it demonstrated that he was the
child's father. Despite this information, he waited until August to file a paternity action.
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Such delay is inconsistent with a father's commitment to parental responsibilities.
The district court properly dismissed the Petition.

CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Mr. Rowe failed to demonstrate his commitment to
parenthood through strict compliance with the terms of the Utah Adoption Act. Although
he raises several arguments that he contends justify that failure, none finds support in
Utah law. By his failure to comply with the Act, Mr. Rowe waived and surrendered any
right which he may have had in relation to the child. As such, the district court properly
dismissed his Petition.
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